Tag Archives: punishment

Tupaz v. Ulep

Standard

GR. No. 127777, October 1, 1999

Facts: State Prosecutor filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City an information against herein petitioner Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation for nonpayment of deficiency in corporate income tax for the year 1979 but was later dismissed and denied upon reconsideration.

Subsequently, the same prosecutor filed two (2) informations before Regional Trial Court (RTC), for the same alleged non-payment of deficiency of corporate income tax for the year 1979, one was raffled to Branch 105 while the other to Branch 86.  Respondent Judge Ulep issued an order directing the prosecution to withdraw the information in Branch 86 after discovering that said information was identical to that filed with Branch 105.  The prosecutor withdrew the information and was granted. But later on filed a motion to reinstate the same, stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and the result of excusable neglect—to which the respondent Judge granted the motion over the objections of the petitioner.  Petitioner files this petition assailing that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information because the offense has prescribed and exposed her to double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement of the criminal information has exposed petitioner to double jeopardy

Held: Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioner’s consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed.  Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused’s conformity.  As petitioner’s consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case.  Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy.