Mata vs. Bayona

G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses

FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?

HELD:YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Alvarez vs. CFI

64 Phil. 33 (1937)

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc.  Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal.  On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.

Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts

Aberca vs. Ver

160 SCRA 590 (1989)

FACTS: This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver “to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,”

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties.

ISSUE: 

1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damagesfor illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteedunder the Constitution?

2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?

HELD:

1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.  Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person ‘directly’ or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

People vs. Rondero

G.R. 125687, December 9, 1999

EXCLUSIONARY RULE

ART III SECTION 3.  (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 12.

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him?

HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.

Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC

G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.

YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti,  the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held:  Yes.

Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.

It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

Zulueta v. Court of Apeals

253 SCRA 699 (1996)

Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin. Sometime March 26, 1962, Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents belonging to private respondent, [i.e. greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, passport, and photographs], Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication/correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of aggrieved party.

HELD: YES. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a “lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

People vs. Albofera

152 SCRA 123 (1987)

FACTS: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the killing. The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested. Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of the victim, Carancio, and that the group “sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.”

Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit  and testify in his favor instead. Later the accused were convicted of murder.

ISSUE: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy.

HELD: No, the production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.

Chavez vs. Court of Appeals

24 SCRA 663 (1968)

Facts:  Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.

Petitioner was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self – incrimination had been violated – to warrant writ of HC?

HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;

Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to the guilty

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are disregarded.  Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.  That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final.  For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:

A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to failure to complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, “to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Tupaz v. Ulep

GR. No. 127777, October 1, 1999

Facts: State Prosecutor filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City an information against herein petitioner Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation for nonpayment of deficiency in corporate income tax for the year 1979 but was later dismissed and denied upon reconsideration.

Subsequently, the same prosecutor filed two (2) informations before Regional Trial Court (RTC), for the same alleged non-payment of deficiency of corporate income tax for the year 1979, one was raffled to Branch 105 while the other to Branch 86.  Respondent Judge Ulep issued an order directing the prosecution to withdraw the information in Branch 86 after discovering that said information was identical to that filed with Branch 105.  The prosecutor withdrew the information and was granted. But later on filed a motion to reinstate the same, stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and the result of excusable neglect—to which the respondent Judge granted the motion over the objections of the petitioner.  Petitioner files this petition assailing that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information because the offense has prescribed and exposed her to double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement of the criminal information has exposed petitioner to double jeopardy

Held: Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioner’s consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed.  Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused’s conformity.  As petitioner’s consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case.  Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy.

Bernat vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 158018. May 20, 2004

FACTS: On August 14, 1991, petitioner, along with several co-accused, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.5 After arraignment and the presentation of the parties’ testimonial and documentary evidence, the case was eventually submitted for decision on August 23, 1994 before the Second Division. Thereafter, the case remained pending and unacted upon until the reorganization of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Administrative Order 266-97, and the case was unloaded to the newly created Fifth Division.

•  The case was originally assigned to Justice Godofredo Legaspi. Later, it was re-assigned to Justice Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada on November 3, 1998.
• Justice Cortez-Estrada was writing the decision of the case, she found out that the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) was missing from the records turned over to her.
• Clerk of Court of the Fifth Division informed the parties and ordered them to attend a conference to discuss on April 19, 2002
• Petitioner filed a comment manifesting that he is strongly averse to any further proceeding occasioned by the lack of stenographic notes, as he should not be prejudiced by the fault or negligence of another
• On September 4, 2002, petitioner filed his Motion to Dismiss but was dismissed by SandiganBayan

ISSUE: Is there a violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable delay in the disposition of a criminal case which stands undecided until now (May 2004) although submitted for decision on August 25, 1994?

HELD: Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of all persons to a “speedy disposition of their cases.” Nevertheless, this right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.7 Moreover, the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be based on a mere mathematical reckoning of time. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. As a guideline, the Court in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan mentioned certain factors that should be considered and balanced, namely: 1) length of delay; 2) reasons for the delay; 3) assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and 4) prejudice caused by the delay
Following these principles, the Court finds there was no violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case
It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right — a situation amounting to laches. petitioner herein failed seasonably to assert his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. During the 8-year period, prior to the April 19, 2002 conference between the parties, petitioner did not complain about the long delay in deciding his case. It was only after the missing TSN’s were brought to his attention that petitioner showed an interest in the termination of his case.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s individual rights should not work against and preclude the people’s equally important right to public justice.