LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs THE CITY OF PASIG

[G.R. No. 136349. January 23, 2006.]

FACTS:
• Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
• The then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
• Again, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly “in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”
• Petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”
• In its letter, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents.”
• Subsequently, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation
• petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
• Trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig

ISSUE: WON expropriation was valid

HELD: NO.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN; CONSTRUED. — In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of eminent domain as “the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor.” It has also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise. Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.

NO “GENUINE NECESSITY” TO JUSTIFY EXPROPRIATION IN CASE AT BAR; PURPOSE OF EXPROPRIATION IS NOT CLEARLY AND CATEGORICALLY PUBLIC. — In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not dispute this. Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify the expropriation. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that “necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.” Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

THE RIGHT TO OWN AND POSSESS PROPERTY IS ONE OF THE MOST CHERISHED RIGHTS OF MEN; UNLESS THE REQUISITE OF GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE EXPROPRIATION OF ONE’S PROPERTY IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE COURTS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO THEIR PRIVATE PROPERTY. — The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one’s property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.

PERCIVAL MODAY vs COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 107916. February 20, 1997.]

FACTS:
• On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,
“Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities.
• In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval
• Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that “expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center.”
• The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC
• , public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government’s best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property
• the Regional Trial Court granted respondent municipality’s motion to take possession of the land
o that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective.
o that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under the old LGC
o that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
CA upheld the trial court. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property.

ISSUE: whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: YES.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation
The Municipality of Bunawan’s power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code 18 in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:
“Section 9.Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.”

POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (B.P. 337); POWER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN TO REVIEW ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS PROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR; DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY MUST BE ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN BAYAN OR MAYOR TO ISSUE THE RESOLUTION, ORDINANCE OR ORDER UNDER REVIEW. — The Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. BLG. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court’s pronouncements in Velazco vs. Blas, where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. “The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is ‘beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.’ Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board’s) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority.” Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners’ property.