LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs THE CITY OF PASIG

Standard

[G.R. No. 136349. January 23, 2006.]

FACTS:
• Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
• The then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
• Again, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly “in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”
• Petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”
• In its letter, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents.”
• Subsequently, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation
• petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
• Trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig

ISSUE: WON expropriation was valid

HELD: NO.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN; CONSTRUED. — In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of eminent domain as “the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor.” It has also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise. Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.

NO “GENUINE NECESSITY” TO JUSTIFY EXPROPRIATION IN CASE AT BAR; PURPOSE OF EXPROPRIATION IS NOT CLEARLY AND CATEGORICALLY PUBLIC. — In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not dispute this. Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify the expropriation. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that “necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.” Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

THE RIGHT TO OWN AND POSSESS PROPERTY IS ONE OF THE MOST CHERISHED RIGHTS OF MEN; UNLESS THE REQUISITE OF GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE EXPROPRIATION OF ONE’S PROPERTY IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE COURTS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO THEIR PRIVATE PROPERTY. — The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one’s property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.

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